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The Florida processed orange industry has become more concentrated in the last two 
decades raising questions on competitive behavior, particularly with respect to the purchase by 
processors of fruit from Florida orange growers.  Has the processor bargaining position been 
transformed  through  concentration  to  a  point  where  it  may  adversely  impact  the  price  that 
Florida growers receive for their fruit?  Whether or not noncompetitive behavior occurs is often 
difficult  to  determine  but  the  Federal  Government  recognized  such  possibilities  when  it 
established  antitrust  laws  in  the  late  1800s.    The  Clayton  Act  makes  illegal  mergers  that 
significantly reduce competition, while the Robinson-Patman Act makes illegal some types of 
price discrimination and buying power. 
  In addition to the increase in concentration at the processing level, there has been an 
increase in concentration at the retail grocery store level, which may adversely impact the prices 
received  by processors  for orange juice  (OJ) sold  to  retailers.   As a result of  grocery  store 
concentration,  there  may  be  a  greater  tendency  for  retailers  to  extract  lower  prices  from 
processors, in turn, possibly resulting in lower prices for growers even without exertion of any 
buying power by processors on growers. 
There are two basic forms of noncompetitive behavior.  The first is when a monopoly 
(one  seller)  or  oligopoly  (a  group  of  sellers)  charges  buyers  higher  prices  than  would  have 
occurred under a competitive market structure.  The second is when a monopsony (one buyer) or 
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oligopsony (a group of buyers) uses its bargaining power to obtain lower prices from suppliers 
than would occur under a competitive structure.  As noted by Foer,
2 monopoly and oligopoly 
have been the main focus of antitrust law enforcement but monopsony and oligop sony  are 
equally  important  threats  to  competitive  markets.   Mega-retailers  may  dictate  terms  and 
conditions of trade as manufactures compete for space in grocery stores.  Volume discounts may 
be extracted from suppliers and slotting allowances for prime shelf space charged. 
  The purpose of this  paper is to examine the changes in market structure of the Florida 
orange industry  at the processor as well as retail and grower levels.   Industry structure and 
anticompetitive behavior has been an issue in various food industries, and a literature review of 
this topic  is first provided.  Then citrus  data are discussed, revealing that concentration has 
increased  at  both  the  retail  and  processor  levels,  while  there  has  been  little  change  in 
concentration at the grower level.  A review of price margins is also provided. 
 
Literature Review of Market Power in Agricultural Markets 
 
Significant  structural  changes  have  occurred  over  time  in  the  agricultural  sector 
especially in the food processing and packing industries.  These changes have resulted in highly 
concentrated processing and packing industries, raising concerns over the exercise of market 
power or power over price.   
  Rogers  and  Sexton  (1994)  argued  that  markets  for  raw  agricultural  products  may  be 
subject to oligopsony behavior due to their distinctive structural characteristics.  Such markets 
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are characterized by 1) products that are often bulky and/or perishable restricting geographic 
mobility; 2) farmers that are specialized in supplying particular commodities; 3) product supplies 
that  are  inelastic;  4)  processors’  needs  that  are  highly  specialized;  and  5)  the  presence  of 
bargaining cooperatives.  High buyer concentration combined with an inelastic supply of the 
farm commodity suggests buyer market power may be exerted.  Looking at the 1987 Census of 
Manufacturing data for fifty-three food and tobacco industries, Rogers and Sexton observed that 
most industries have experienced decreasing firm numbers and increasing concentration over 
time.  They also indicated that sellers to the processing industries face fewer and more dominant 
firms.    From  their  analysis  it  was  concluded  that  oligopsony  behavior  deserves  strong 
consideration in food industry policy debates. 
Within  the  agricultural  sector,  evidence  of  market  power  and  its  use  varies  across 
industries.  The meat processing and packing industry is highly concentrated, and the potential 
for anticompetitive behavior in this industry has been of concern since the late 1800’s.  In the 
beef  packing  industry,  a  high  degree  of  concentration  has  prompted  Federal  investigations 
concerning the conduct of beef buyers.  Several studies have been conducted with the purpose of 
measuring the degree of oligopsony power in this industry. 
Schroeter  (1988)  investigated  the  degree  of  market  power  in  the  U.S.  beef  packing 
industry over the period from 1951 through 1983.  His results confirmed the presence of price 
distortions  due  to  monopoly/monopsony  power.    The  price  distortions  were  statistically 
significant but small in magnitude.  In the latest years of his sample he estimated the output and 
input market relative price distortions to be about 3% and 1%, respectively, i.e., output prices 
were 3% higher than would have occurred under competition, while input price were 1% lower 
than if competitive bargaining would have prevailed.  His analysis also suggested that in spite of 4 
 
the trend toward higher concentration there was no indication of less competitive performance 
during the period of increasing concentration.  
Stiegert, Azzam, and Borsen (1993) analyzed the presence of market power in the beef 
packing industry by looking at the effects of anticipated and unanticipated cattle supplies on the  
markdown  pricing  (the  deviation  of  fed  cattle  price  or  price  paid  for  live  cattle  from  the 
associated marginal value of the product).  Their results indicated that fed cattle were priced 
significantly below their marginal value during 31 of the 59 quarters between the second quarter 
of 1972 and the fourth quarter of 1986.  The average markdown was 1.31%.  From their results, 
however, it was not clear that a causal relationship existed between increased concentration in 
the late 1970’s and markdown events.  After 1981, the markdown was statistically significant for 
only one year.  Overall, their results were consistent with Schroeter’s findings that concentration 
has not increased market power.  They concluded that even though deviations of fed cattle prices 
from marginal product values are an indication of market power, markdown pricing may be a 
means for beef packers to avoid economic losses due to inadequate beef supplies to operate 
slaughter plants efficiently. 
  Azzam and Schroeter (1995) and Azzam (1997) addressed the issue of market power as it 
relates to cost efficiency resulting from consolidation in the beef packing industry.  Azzam and 
Schroeter’s results suggested that when consolidation leads to economies of scale and increased 
market power, unit cost savings of relatively modest magnitudes are sufficient to negate the 
welfare losses due to anticompetitive pricing.  Specifically, they found that the estimated cost 
savings necessary to neutralize the anticompetitive effects of consolidation in beef packing are 
about half the actual cost savings from scale economies.  From the analysis it was concluded that 
anticompetitive behavior related to increasing beef packing concentration exists, but associated 5 
 
welfare losses are more than offset by lower costs.  Therefore, distributional effects aside, the 
structural changes in the beef packing industry have been welfare enhancing.  Azzam’s findings 
provide support for Azzam and Schroeter’s simulations results.  He found that the benefits of 
concentration  in  beef  packing,  in  terms  of  slaughter  cost  efficiency,  were  twice  the  cost  of 
market power.  In other words, the cost efficiency effect outweighed the market power effect. 
Morrison Paul (2001a) studied cost economies and market power in the case of the meat 
packing  industry.    The  analysis  indicated  that  typical  market  power  measures  could  be 
misleading in the case where scale (cost) economies prevailed, because cost efficiencies rather 
than market deficiencies could be the driving force for imperfect competition patterns.  The 
results indicated the presence of significant but declining market power and cost economies in 
the U.S. meat packing industry.  Markups of output price due to monopoly power were apparent, 
but evidence of markdowns due to monopsony behavior in the livestock market was weak.  So 
although net market power was substantive, it was primarily evident on the output side.  From 
the analysis it was concluded that the consolidation trend was motivated by cost economies and 
little excess profitability existed.  
Morrison  Paul  (2001b)  generated  similar  results  when  studying  the  market  and  cost 
structure for the U.S. beef packing industry for the period from 1992 through 1993.  The results 
suggested significant cost economies in this industry, but little if any market power exploitation 
in either the cattle input or beef output markets or excess profitability.  The lack of excess 
profitability suggested some form of effective competition at work.  
  A number of empirical studies provide evidence of a counterintuitive inverse relationship 
between market power and industry concentration in the meat packing/processing sector. 6 
 
Schroeter and Azzam (1991) identified a trend toward decreasing market power in the 
hog packing industry during a period of increasing market concentration from 1972 through 
1988.  A possible explanation given was that large packing plants could achieve significant cost 
economies, overwhelming the incentives for oligoponistic behavior.  
Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993) also found that meatpacker concentration increased 
in the fed cattle industry between the 1980-82 period and the 1984-86 period.  However, their 
analysis suggested that a decrease in the probability of cooperation between meatpackers in each 
regional market occurred, resulting in a decrease in market power in the second period.  Market 
power appeared to have been exercised in fed cattle purchases during the early to mid 1980’s in 
the regional markets examined, however, there were differences across periods and regions.  The 
authors concluded that varying conduct across markets and over time may occur and suggested 
monitoring of fed cattle markets to assure a competitive environment.   
Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) developed a model to measure the degree of oligopsony 
power,  and  applied  their  model  to  the  beef  packing  industry.    However,  no  evidence  of 
oligopsony power was found over the sample period from 1967 through 1993, contradicting the 
results of some previous studies of the beef packing industry which indicated that beef packing 
firms, at least part of the time, have exercised some kind of market power in the purchase of 
cattle for slaughter. 
  Oligopsony behavior has  also  been  a concern in  other food processing sectors.    The 
potato processing industry has drawn particular attention.  This industry is highly concentrated, 
localized,  and  susceptible  to  oligopsony  power.    Richards,  Patterson,  and  Acharya  (2001) 
investigated the potato processing industry over the period 1984 through 1998 in an attempt to 
determine whether frozen potato processors behave as an oligopsony, including the specific form 7 
 
of  the  strategic  interaction  among  processing  firms.    They  also  examined  possible  losses  in 
grower’s surplus resulting from processors’ market power.  During the period studied, the potato 
processing industry was dominated by five major firms.  Although no direct evidence tied these 
firms to a buying cartel, there was a high potential for anticompetitive behavior.  The study 
found considerable statistical support for anticompetitive, discontinuous pricing strategies among 
potato buyers.  The results suggested that processors colluded, on average, about 65% of the 
time.    It  was  also  found  that  the  loss  in  producer  surplus  to  the  oligopsony  amounted  to 
approximately 1.6% of market revenue per month, which would have likely meant the difference 
between  profit  and  loss  for  many  growers.    Processor’s  oligopsony  power  was  found  to  be 
enhanced by higher domestic production, imports and existing stocks, but ameliorated by high 
capacity utilization rates and exports. 
  Katchova, Sheldon, and Miranda (2005) developed a linear-quadratic dynamic model to 
examine market conduct and price distortions in the U.S. potato chips and frozen French fries 
sectors over the period from 1960 though 1999.  The model assumes quadratic adjustments in 
processor costs associated with changes in the processed quantity of input.  The results of their 
study indicated that the behavior of potato processing firms is much closer to price taking than to 
collusion.  Furthermore, price distortions due to oligopsony power in the purchase of potatoes 
were smaller than price distortions due to oligopoly in both the potato chips and frozen French 
fries sectors.  The analysis suggested that the potato processing industry was able to extract from 
potato  growers  some  oligopsony  rents,  but  the  rents  were  lower  than  the  oligopoly  rents 
extracted from consumers of either potato chips or French fries.  Although their results supported 
those  found  by  Richards,  Patterson,  and  Acharya  (2001),  their  analysis  suggested  that  the 
potential oligopsony rents were lower in the presence of output adjustment costs.  8 
 
  Just  and Chern (1980)  studied the potential presence of market power in  the tomato 
processing industry subject to an exogenous shock, the introduction of mechanical harvesting 
technology.  A theoretical framework was developed for both the competitive and the oligopsony 
cases.  The analysis was conducted following a simple supply-demand model for both the pre-
harvester period from 1951 through 1963 and the post-harvester period from 1967 through 1975.  
Differences in the pre- and post- harvester cases were analyzed in an attempt to determine the 
competitive versus the non-competitive behavior associated with the tomato harvester.  In the 
case of the California tomato processing industry, prior research had suggested that a single firm 
had been the dominant tomato canner for a long period of time and that the dominance of the 
firm was exercised in the form of price leadership when more firms were present.  Therefore, the 
Just and Chern study tested the null hypothesis of competition versus the alternative hypothesis 
of dominant-firm-price-leadership oligopsony.  The empirical results supported the dominant-
firm-price-leadership oligopsony.  
Durham and Sexton (1992) further studied the tomato processing industry in California, 
applying an empirical model they developed to analyze the potential of exercising oligopsony 
power in food markets.  Six regional groups of firms over the period from 1985 through 1989 
were studied.  The results indicated that market-power potential in the California processing 
tomato market was limited, contradicting the findings of Just and Chern.  From the analysis it 
was  concluded  that  rivalry  between  neighboring  markets  was  adequate  to  make  them  quite 
competitive and the industry no longer had a single dominant processor as identified by Just and 
Chern.  
Wann and Sexton (1992) studied imperfect competition in multiproduct food industries, 
focusing on California pear processing over the period from 1950 through 1986.  The California 9 
 
pear  processing  industry  was  selected  because  of  the  large  number  of  growers  selling  to 
relatively few pear processors.  Imperfect competition on both the buying and the selling side of 
the market was considered.  Based on the array of product forms made from raw pears, a model 
was developed to distinguish input market power from output market power, assuming that there 
is a competitive “benchmark” processed product form.  Oligopsony power was then estimated by 
comparing the margin (difference between the processed and raw-pear prices) for each processed 
product form with the margin for the benchmark product form.  Their results indicated that the 
pear processing industry has exerted power in both its raw input market and the markets for 
canned pears and fruit cocktail.  The grade pack pear market was found to be less concentrated 
and therefore more competitive.   
Crespi,  Gao,  and  Peterson  (2005)  looked  at  oligopsony  behavior  in  the  rice  milling 
industry for the period from 1978 through 2001. They derived a set of equations to estimate 
buyer market power.  Their model contained fewer equations with less explicit functional forms 
compared to other models typically used in such studies.  They applied the model to the U.S. rice 
milling industry, which due to restructuring and consolidation was considered to be a rather 
stable structural  oligopsony with  respect  to  the purchasing of rice by  millers from  domestic 
producers; millers, however, appeared to operate in a rather competitive output market. When 
testing for market power, they found that the prices paid for rough rice by the milling industry 
were lower than what would have occurred under competitive conditions. Their market conduct 
parameter was estimated to be 0.27, similar in magnitude with many reported market conduct 
parameters  in  other  agricultural  industries,  suggesting  rather  modest  oligopsony  power, 
analogous to a symmetric, four-firm oligopsony market under Cournot behavior. They concluded 
that the U.S. rice industry has characteristics of structural oligopsony in purchasing rough rice, 10 
 
but is competitive in the output market for milled rice. The degree of oligopsony behavior found 
in rice milling was consistent with oligopsony behavior found in other agricultural markets.  
Sexton, Zhang and Chalfant (2005) examined retail-farm price margins for perishable 
fresh produce, and found that retail buyers have exercised oligopsony power in procuring iceberg 
lettuce from growers.  They also examined fresh tomatoes and found mixed results with respect 
to oligopsony power. 
In summary, a number of studies suggest non-competitive behavior in various sectors of 
the  food  industry.    Market  conduct  was  found  to  be  related  to  product  characteristics  and 
concentration levels.  However, although research suggests that some form of market power is 
being exercised in the food processing industry, at least part of the time, the estimated extent 
varies depending on the commodity market, as well as estimation methods and procedures used 
to determine the market behavior.   
 
Orange Processor Concentration 
 
In the Florida orange industry, concentration at the processor level is based on Florida 
Department of Citrus (FDOC) records on box-paid taxes by processors (by State law, all Florida 
processors must pay a tax to the FDOC on the amount of oranges processed; the tax is used to 
promote  Florida  OJ  and  conduct  citrus  research).    The  data  are  confidential  and  individual 
processors  will  not  be  noted.    The  measures  of  concentration  are  for  the  overall  group  of 
processors.   
Over the last  two decades,  the number of Florida orange processors has  declined by 
57.7%  from  52  in  1987-88  to  22  in  2006-07  (Table  1).    The  four  firm  concentration  ratio 11 
 
(percentage of the total tax-paid boxes that the four largest processors account for) has increased 
from a low of 42.6% in 1995-96 to highs of 68 to 69% from 2004-05 through 2006-07.  The 
eight firm concentration ratio has increased from 63.0% in 1995-96 to 96.8% in 2006-07. 
Three additional measures of processor concentration were calculated from the tax-paid 
data---1) Theil’s Index (TI) based on his measure of entropy, 2) the Herfindahl Index (HI) and 3) 
the Gini Coefficient (GC).  Letting wi be the share of total processed boxes accounted for by firm 
i, TI = ∑i= 1 to n wi log(wi/(1/n)).  A firm’s share would be (1/n) when each firm processes the 
same amount of fruit.  Thus, the term wi/(1/n) is the i
th firm’s processing share relative to the 
equal share, the term log(wi/(1/n)) is a measure of the percentage difference between the actual 
and equal processing shares, and TI is a measure of the weighted average percentage difference 
in the actual and equal shares.  TI = 0 when all firms have an equal processing share, while T = 
log (n) when one firm accounts for all the processing (n = 127 in the present analysis or the total 
number of different processors over the period from 1987-88 through 2006-07).  In Table 1, we 
see that TI has increased from 1.97 in 1995-96 to 2.76 in 2006-07, indicating an increase in 
processing concentration. 
The Herfindahl index is defined as HI = ∑i= 1 to n wi
2, taking a value of 1/n when each firm 
has an equal share and one when a single firm accounts for all of the industry’s processing.  HI 
has increased from 0.08 to .10 from 1987-88 through 1998-99 to 0.15 to .16 from 2004-05 
through 2006-07, again indicating an increase in concentration. 
The Gini Coefficient is defined by the Lorenz curve which in the present case shows the 
cumulative  percentage  of  industry  processing  for  firms  ranked  from  smallest  to  the  largest 
(Figure 1).  In Figure 1, let the area between the horizontal axis (x axis) and the Lorenz curve be 
A.  The Gini Coefficient is then defined as GC = 1-2A.  We approximate the area A for the 12 
 
discrete data used in this study.
3  The GC ranges from zero (each processor has an equal share of 
the tax-paid boxes) to one (one processor accounts for all the tax-paid boxes).  In Table 1, we see 
that the GC has increased from 0.78 in 1995-96 to 0.90 in 2004-05 through 2006-07.  Thus, the 
GC and other measures of concentrations indicate a notable increase in processed orange 




Based  on  Census  of  Agriculture  data  (United  States  Department  of  Agriculture),  the 
structure of the Florida orange industry at the farm or grove level has been relatively stable over 
the last two decades.  The data reflect individual groves and not grove ownership.  An individual 
or group may own more than one grove, and one grove could be jointly owned by a group.  
Nevertheless, the data provide an indirect indication of the grower structure in Florida.  Over the 
period from 1997 through 2002, about 7,000 to 8,000 orange groves have been in operation in 
Florida (Table 2).  Large groves have accounted for most of the acreage.  For example, in 2002, 
208 groves, representing 2.9% of all groves, each had 500 or more acres, and together accounted 
for 64.0% of Florida’s orange acres.  The Lorenz curve at the grove level for 2002 shows a 
relatively  high  level  of  concentration  (Figure  2).    Table  3  shows  that  grove  concentration, 
measured by the GI and TI, has been relatively stable over time. 
Concentration of Florida’s orange acreage among large groves raises the issue that large 
growers might act together to extract favorable prices from processors.  As noted above, this 
issue can not be directly addressed since the data on groves may not reflect grove ownership.  It 
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can be noted, however, that the larger the number of grove owners the less likely growers will 
behave non-competitively; and, although concentration of acreage among large groves exists in 
Florida, there is still a relatively large number of large groves.  For example in 2002, the total 
number of large groves defined by 1,000 or more acres per grove (accounting for 1.5% of the 




Over the last decade, concentration at the retail food level has increased raising concern 
over noncompetitive pricing behavior as mentioned in the introduction.  Table 4 shows several 
concentration ratios in 2002 versus 1992. For example, the eight firm concentration ratio for 
grocery stores increased from 25.3% in 1992 to 43.4% in 2002.   
Have  large  food  retailers  obtained  lower  prices  from  processors  and  indirectly  from 
growers  than  would  have  occurred  if  the  retail  industry  were  less  concentrated?  Non-
competitive pricing is difficult to determine.  Below, some historical price data at the industry 
level are reviewed to address this issue.  Price data for individual firms were not available to 




Prices are dependent on fundamental supply and demand factors, costs underlying price 
margins,  the  amount  of  price  dealing  or  price-promotions  occurring  in  retail  stores,  and 
bargaining between growers and processors, and processors and retailers.  Prices at the grower, 14 
 
processor and retail levels over the period from 1988-89 through 2005-06 are shown in Table 5.  
The grower delivered-in price, processor FOB price for bulk frozen concentrated orange juice 
(FCOJ), and retail prices for FCOJ, not-from-concentrated orange juice (NFC), reconstituted 
orange juice (RECON) and the total orange juice category are provided.  The margins between 
the FOB price for bulk FCOJ and the grower price, and between the FOB price and the retail 
prices are also provided (Table 6, Figures 3 and 4).  The data indicate that the real (CPI deflated) 
FOB-grower price margin, although variable, has tended to decline over time, while the real 
retail-FOB price margins have varied with no clear tendency.  The decline in the FOB-grower 
margin is not consistent with the expectation that the increase in concentration at the processing 
level over time would favor processors in bargaining grower prices.  If processors had set prices 
to their advantage, an increase in the margins would have been expected, all else constant. 
All  else,  however,  was  not  constant  over  the  period  of  increasing  processing 
concentration  and  the  downward  trend  in  the  FOB-grower  price  margin.    Crop  sizes  and 
associated boxes utilized for processing tended to increase over time, spreading fixed costs out 
across larger output levels and resulting in lower average fixed costs.  At the same time, the costs 
of some of the inputs used in processing such as energy increased over time.  Changes in the 
processor-by-product allowance (for the value of citrus oils and citrus pulp made from processed 
oranges) may also help explain changes in the margin (the FOB price only reflects the value of 
OJ and not the values of by products).  Additionally, in seasons when the orange crop was not 
large enough to operate processing plants at or near full capacity, processors may have bid up 
fruit prices, attempting to secure fruit to increase operating efficiency and achieve reduced per 
unit costs. 15 
 
It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  separate  effects  of  processor  concentration  and  other 
factors that impact the processor-grower price margin, based on the available annual data at hand 
(1989-90 through 2005-06).  In preliminary analysis, the FOB-grower margin was related to the 
number of processed boxes, the producer price index for fuel and energy, the NFC share out of 
total  production,  and  the  level  of  processor  concentration  (TI,  HI  GC  were  alternatively 
considered as explanatory variables).  However, the coefficients for the different measures of 
processor  concentration  and  most  of  the  other  explanatory  variables  were  not  statistically 
significant at the α. = .10 level.  A major problem with this analysis was multicollinearity.  For 
example, the simple correlations between the processor concentration measures and the price of 
fuels and energy were .80 or higher, depending on the concentration measure used. 
Retail FCOJ-FOB and RECON-FOB price margins are shown in Figure 6 (the margins 
for NFC and total OJ follow similar patterns, although the cost of NFC differs from that for 
FCOJ with respect to storage and transportation).  The variability in these price margins may be 
related to changes in costs and retail dealing over time.  Based on these data, however, there is 
no clear pattern that the retail-FOB price margins  are increasing over time and retailers  are 
exerting oligopsony power over processors, as might be expected given the increase in retail 
concentration over this period.  Caution, however, should be taken in reaching conclusions given 
the level of data aggregation.  Retail and FOB prices are averages across grocery stores and 
processors,  respectively,  and  individual  firm  level  data  may  reveal  other  patterns.    This 
cautionary point also applies to the FOB-grower price margins discussed above, which are based 
on average FOB and grower delivered-in prices.  That is, price data for individual processors and 
growers may indicate price-margin patterns that differ from what has been found here based on 





Based  on  a  number  of  published  studies,  non-competitive  pricing  appears  to  have 
occurred at times in some food industries, although findings have varied across industries and 
modeling approaches used in the analyses.  The results suggest that the increase in concentration 
in the Florida orange processing industry, as well as the increase in concentration at the retail 
grocery store level, has increased the likelihood of non-competitive pricing behavior involving 
these industrial sectors.  The more concentrated the processors are, the more likely they will 
behave as an oligopsony in determining fruit prices that growers receive.  Based on an analysis 
of data on the FOB-grower price margin, processor concentration and other variables that may 
affect  the  margin,  it  is  problematic,  however,  to  conclude  that  the  increase  in  processor 
concentration  over  time  did  in  fact  adversely  impact  grower  prices.  While  processor 
concentration has increased, the FOB-grower price margin has tended to decline, the opposite of 
what would be expected based on the concentration change by itself.  The analysis, however, is 
plagued  by  multicollinearity  among  the  variables  used  to  explain  the  price  margin.  The 
possibility of an adverse impact on processor prices as a result of retail concentration is also 
difficult to determine from the data.  Variability in the retail-FOB price margins has occurred but 
there are no clear trends. 
Although the price data examined in this study do not directly support non-competitive 
pricing behavior in the Florida orange industry, caution should be taken in concluding that such 
behavior has not occurred.  FOB and fruit prices used in the present analysis are averages across 17 
 
processors and growers, respectively, and disaggregated data for individuals may reveal other 
price patterns. 
  18 
 
 
Table 1. Alternative Measures of the Distribution of Farms, By Sizes.  

















4  Gini Coeff
5  
             
1987-88  52  46.8%  68.8%  2.03  0.08  0.80 
1988-89  44  46.7%  69.6%  2.05  0.08  0.81 
1989-90  46  49.5%  70.7%  2.09  0.10  0.81 
1990-91  42  51.5%  72.8%  2.14  0.09  0.82 
1991-92  41  49.1%  72.2%  2.15  0.09  0.82 
1992-93  44  46.6%  69.0%  2.06  0.08  0.81 
1993-94  47  47.4%  69.6%  2.07  0.09  0.81 
1994-95  43  42.9%  65.3%  1.98  0.08  0.79 
1995-96  44  42.6%  63.0%  1.97  0.08  0.78 
1996-97  49  44.6%  66.5%  2.02  0.08  0.80 
1997-98  46  49.8%  71.2%  2.15  0.09  0.82 
1998-99  45  54.0%  74.9%  2.22  0.10  0.84 
1999-00  43  53.7%  76.9%  2.27  0.11  0.84 
2000-01  43  61.3%  86.2%  2.49  0.13  0.88 
2001-02  40  62.3%  87.9%  2.56  0.13  0.88 
2002-03  35  61.4%  88.2%  2.54  0.13  0.88 
2003-04  37  58.7%  86.8%  2.49  0.12  0.87 
2004-05  31  68.1%  94.0%  2.72  0.16  0.90 
2005-06  29  69.9%  94.8%  2.74  0.15  0.90 
2006-07  22  68.2%  96.8%  2.76  0.15  0.90 
              
Source: Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC).       
1 The percentage of FDOC tax-paid processed boxes accounted for by the four largest processors. 
2 The percentage of FDOC tax-paid processed boxes accounted for by the eight largest processors. 
3 The Theil index increases as concentration increases, ranging from zero (each processor has an equal share 
of the tax-paid boxes) to log of n (one out of n processors accounts for all the tax-paid boxes). 
4 The Herfindahl coefficient equals 1/n when each of n processors has an equal share of the tax-paid boxes, 
and one when one processor accounts for all the tax-paid boxes. 
5 The Gini coefficient ranges from zero (each processor has an equal share of the tax-paid boxes) to one (one 





Figure 1. Florida Orange Processors: 2006-07 Lorenz  
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Table 2. Florida Orange Farms/Groves & Acres.         
Grove Size 
Distribution of Farms, By Size  Distribution of Acreage, By Grove Size 
1987  1992  1997  2002  1987  1992  1997  2002 
Acres  Number of Farms( Growers)  Acres 
0.1 to 0.9  204  307  357  350  85  130  151  167 
1.0 to 4.9  1,409  1,418  1,615  1,181  3,736  3,565  4,166  2,989 
5.0 to 14.9  2,243  1,993  2,181  2,028  19,054  17,209  18,727  17,060 
15.0 to 24.9  1,113  978  1,086  904  20,739  18,477  20,459  17,172 
25.0 to 49.9  1,024  1,065  1,154  1,009  35,134  36,419  39,772  34,823 
50.0 to 99.9  582  708  750  706  39,079  47,639  50,495  48,018 
100.0 or more        894        599,445 
100.0 to 249.9  440  438  443  496  66,364  67,386  66,842  74,386 
250.0 to 499.9  128  149  177  190  44,527  51,201  60,545  64,317 
500.0 or more  191  242  264  208  342,554  449,964  502,466  460,742 
500.0 to 749.9  46  59  77  49  na  35,954  46,335  28,777 
750.0 to 999.9  31  40  45  43  na  34,217  38,305  36,332 
1,000.0 or more  114  143  142  116  na  379,793  417,826  395,633 
1000.0 to 1,499.9  na  na  na  38  na  na  na  47,105 
1,500.0 or more  na  na  na  78  na  na  na  348,528 
Total Farms  7,334  7,298  8,027  7,072  571,272  691,990  763,623  719,674 
   Percent of Total 
0.1 to 0.9  2.8%  4.2%  4.4%  4.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
1.0 to 4.9  19.2%  19.4%  20.1%  16.7%  0.7%  0.5%  0.5%  0.4% 
5.0 to 14.9  30.6%  27.3%  27.2%  28.7%  3.3%  2.5%  2.5%  2.4% 
15.0 to 24.9  15.2%  13.4%  13.5%  12.8%  3.6%  2.7%  2.7%  2.4% 
25.0 to 49.9  14.0%  14.6%  14.4%  14.3%  6.2%  5.3%  5.2%  4.8% 
50.0 to 99.9  7.9%  9.7%  9.3%  10.0%  6.8%  6.9%  6.6%  6.7% 
100.0 or more                 
100.0 to 249.9  6.0%  6.0%  5.5%  7.0%  11.6%  9.7%  8.8%  10.3% 
250.0 to 499.9  1.7%  2.0%  2.2%  2.7%  7.8%  7.4%  7.9%  8.9% 
500.0 or more  2.6%  3.3%  3.3%  2.9%  60.0%  65.0%  65.8%  64.0% 
500.0 to 749.9  0.6%  0.8%  1.0%  0.7%  na  5.2%  6.1%  4.0% 
750.0 to 999.9  0.4%  0.5%  0.6%  0.6%  na  4.9%  5.0%  5.0% 
1,000.0 or more  1.6%  2.0%  1.8%  1.6%  na  54.9%  54.7%  55.0% 
1000.0 to 1,499.9  na  na  na  0.5%  na  na  na  6.5% 
1,500.0 or more  na  na  na  1.1%  na  na  na  48.4% 
Total Farms  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
                 




Figure 2.   Distribution of Florida  
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Table 3. Alternative Measures of the Distribution of Farms, By Size.    
             







(No. Acres)       
             
1987  0.823  0.498  0.819       
1992  0.836  0.422  0.941       
1997  0.840  0.423  0.956       
2002  0.837  0.405  0.932       
             
1 The Gini coefficient ranges from zero (each grove category has an equal share 
of the acreage) to one (one grove category accounts for all the acreage). 
2 The Theil index increases as grove concentration increases, ranging from zero 
(each grove category has an equal share of the total farms or acreage) to log of n 









  1992 
2  2002 
3 
  % of Industry Sales 
     
4 Largest Firms  16.1  31.0 
8 Largest Firms  25.3  43.4 
20 Largest Firms  37.6  54.5 
50 Largest Firms  49.9  65.3 
     
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Census: 
Concentration Ratios, 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html. 
     
1 Sales/receipts/revenue for establishments in a 
specified firm size range as a percent of total 
sales/receipts/revenue of all establishments. 
2 SEC code 541.     





Table 5. Processed Orange and OJ Prices.           
                     
  USDA/NASS 
Florida Citrus 






Bulk FCOJ FOB 
FCOJ  NFC  RECON 
Total 
OJ  CPI 
  $/PS 
$/SSE 
Ga.  $/PS 
$/SSE 





                     
1988-89  1.45  1.49  1.67  1.72  3.25  4.98  3.72  3.72  124.0  0.61 
1989-90  1.54  1.58  1.97  2.03  3.64  5.50  4.17  4.20  130.7  0.64 
1990-91  1.25  1.29  1.31  1.35  3.09  5.20  3.80  3.78  136.2  0.67 
1991-92  1.18  1.21  1.53  1.57  3.10  5.23  3.83  3.83  140.3  0.69 
1992-93  0.82  0.84  1.07  1.10  2.71  4.75  3.21  3.39  144.5  0.71 
1993-94  0.92  0.94  1.28  1.32  2.73  4.60  3.19  3.40  148.2  0.73 
1994-95  0.89  0.91  1.21  1.25  2.72  4.65  3.16  3.43  152.4  0.75 
1995-96  1.02  1.04  1.43  1.47  2.91  4.76  3.37  3.64  156.9  0.77 
1996-97  0.83  0.85  1.07  1.10  3.01  4.91  3.52  3.80  160.5  0.79 
1997-98  0.84  0.86  1.19  1.22  2.89  4.76  3.46  3.76  163.0  0.80 
1998-99  0.95  0.98  1.29  1.33  3.15  5.20  3.83  4.21  166.6  0.82 
1999-00  0.86  0.88  1.06  1.09  3.26  5.45  3.90  4.37  172.2  0.85 
2000-01  0.78  0.80  0.90  0.93  3.24  5.40  3.92  4.42  177.1  0.87 
2001-02  0.83  0.86  1.05  1.08  3.28  5.28  3.89  4.44  179.9  0.88 
2002-03  0.82  0.85  1.08  1.11  3.42  5.20  3.88  4.47  184.0  0.90 
2003-04  0.77  0.79  0.84  0.86  3.40  5.11  3.76  4.42  188.9  0.93 
2004-05  0.84  0.87  0.99  1.02  3.39  5.32  3.73  4.51  195.3  0.96 
2005-06  1.17  1.21  1.52  1.56  3.54  5.47  3.98  4.74  203.5  1.00 








Retail-FOB Margin (real) 
FCOJ  NFC  RECON  Total OJ 
  $/SSE Ga./CPI 
1988-89  0.37  2.51  5.36  3.28  3.29 
1989-90  0.69  2.51  5.40  3.34  3.38 
1990-91  0.09  2.61  5.75  3.67  3.63 
1991-92  0.52  2.21  5.30  3.27  3.28 
1992-93  0.37  2.26  5.14  2.97  3.23 
1993-94  0.51  1.94  4.51  2.57  2.86 
1994-95  0.44  1.96  4.55  2.56  2.92 
1995-96  0.55  1.86  4.27  2.46  2.82 
1996-97  0.32  2.43  4.83  3.07  3.43 
1997-98  0.45  2.08  4.41  2.79  3.17 
1998-99  0.42  2.23  4.73  3.06  3.52 
1999-00  0.25  2.56  5.15  3.32  3.88 
2000-01  0.14  2.66  5.14  3.44  4.01 
2001-02  0.25  2.49  4.75  3.18  3.80 
2002-03  0.29  2.55  4.52  3.06  3.71 
2003-04  0.08  2.73  4.57  3.12  3.83 
2004-05  0.16  2.47  4.48  2.83  3.64 
2005-06  0.36  1.98  3.91  2.42  3.18 
 25 
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